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The existence of automatic, unconscious processes influencing human emotion, cognition, and
behavior is widely accepted and confirmed by numerous studies (e.g., Ohme et al., 2001;
Jarymowicz, 2002; Hassin et al., 2005; Wentura and Degner, 2010; Bargh et al., 2012; Bargh, 2014;
Wentura and Rothermund, 2014). Researchers demonstrated the mechanisms of implicit social
cognition, including implicit attitudes and stereotypes (e.g., Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Nosek
et al., 2009; Molden, 2014), implicit affect (e.g., Zajonc, 1980, 2004; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993;
Feldman-Barrett et al., 2005; Ohme, 2005; Kobylin´ska, 2007; Kolan´czyk, 2007), as well as automatic
processes in perception, evaluation and motivation (Bargh, 1997; Bargh et al., 2012; Rotteveel et al.,
2015). Such mechanisms are described as automatically occurring and hard to control or modify.
However, more and more researchers (Baumeister and Vohs, 2004; Koole, 2009; Kobylin´ska and
Karwowska, 2014; Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015) are starting to explore whether an individual
always remains under the unconscious, automatic influence of these processes. Even if intentional,
voluntary control is not possible, some evidence suggests that automatic self-regulation, including
emotion regulation (which does not require person’s conscious knowledge and intention, Fitzimons
and Bargh, 2004; Koole and Rothermund, 2011) can operate outside of conscious awareness and
influence the course of other processes (e.g., emotion) even the implicit ones (e.g., Kolan´czyk and
Pawłowska-Fusiara, 2002; Kobylin´ska, 2007; Wentura and Degner, 2010; Teige-Mocigemba and
Klauer, 2013; Koole et al., 2015).
In this opinion article we base our understanding of emotion regulation on the process model
of emotion regulation proposed by Gross (2008, 2014, 2015a,b), who defined emotion regulation
as a series of processes which cause changes in the dynamics, duration and speed of emotional
activation, as well as changes in accompanying behavior, experience, and physiology. Accordingly,
Gross (2008) argued that regulation could result in decreasing, intensifying or sustaining of either
positive or negative emotions. He distinguished between antecedent-focused and response-focused
regulation showing evidence that the antecedent-focused strategies (e.g., reappraisal) are more
effective and adaptive then the response focused strategies (e.g., suppression) (Gross et al., 2006).
More and more researchers, including ourselves, agree that emotion regulation manifests itself in
a flexibility in experiencing positive and negative emotions by using different emotion regulation
strategies (e.g., Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Bonanno and Burton, 2013; Sheppes et al., 2014; Aldao
et al., 2015). Still, the majority of current research concentrates on the regulation of negative
emotions, as decreasing the intensity or duration of negative emotions seems especially important
for people in a present world (Gross, 2015a). We also focus on regulation of negative emotion.
Our aim is to present some results that indirectly suggested the existence of automatic emotion
regulation as well as some direct evidence (including replication) for this kind of regulation. Results
of our own experiments described below add to the discussion about automatic emotion regulation
showing consensus with previous studies.
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AUTOMATIC EMOTION
REGULATION—INDIRECT EVIDENCE
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in research
on self-regulation in general (Baumeister and Vohs, 2004;
Gross, 2015a). Some of the researchers began to report that
self-regulation may in fact also happen on the automatic or
implicit level (Fitzimons and Bargh, 2004; Koole and Coenen,
2007). Studies presented by Bargh and colleagues (Fitzimons
and Bargh, 2004; Gollwitzer and Bargh, 2005) showed that
the so called higher psychological processes, such as achieving
goals or following norms and values, can be activated in
response to a triggering event, without the individual’s awareness
and intention and influence his or her perception, emotion,
thinking, and behavior (Bargh, 1997, 2014; Bargh et al., 2001;
Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2003). They described the auto-motive
model, according to which goals are represented in the mind
and can be automatically activated (for example, by priming),
influencing the person’s behavior outside of their conscious
awareness. Research on automatic activation of goals and norms
is an important basis for the hypothesis about the existence of
automatic regulation of emotions (Fitzimons and Bargh, 2004;
Bargh and Williams, 2007). It suggests that when goals or norms
referring to regulating emotions are formed in an individual’s
mind, they can be activated without his or her awareness and
influence an emotional response (see also: Mauss and Tamir,
2014). However, although studies described above give a broader
context for understanding how automatic emotion regulation
may work, they do not directly prove its existence.
Mauss et al. (2007, 2008) defined automatic regulation of
emotions as a goal-activated change of any aspect of emotion
without a conscious decision, without directing attention to the
process of regulation and without the engagement of deliberate
control. It usually occurs due to automatic activation of the
goal of changing the emotional process (Williams et al., 2009).
Gyurak et al. (2011) propose a dual-process framework for
emotion regulation, arguing that it can be observed both at
explicit and implicit level. They claim that the automatic emotion
regulation, similarly to the conscious regulation, can involve
changes on different stages of the emotional process, including
attention deployment, cognitive interpretation, or modulation of
emotional reaction and can effectively change the experiential,
psychophysiological, or behavioral aspects of the emotion.
In quite a few papers the indirect evidence for automatic
emotion regulation was described (Fitzimons and Bargh, 2004;
Koole and Jostmann, 2004; Koole and Coenen, 2007; Karwowska
and Kobylin´ska, 2014; Kobylin´ska and Karwowska, 2014).
Fitzimons and Bargh (2004) argued that some of the earlier
studies, for example showing the increase in self-esteem under
conditions of threat to one’s group, could in fact be interpreted
using the framework of automatic regulation of emotions. Some
researchers explain the effects of the declined influence of
affective stimuli on judgments, in people with certain traits or
in certain situational contexts, with the concept of automatic
regulation (Koole and Jostmann, 2004; Koole and Coenen, 2007;
Karwowska and Kobylin´ska, 2014; Kobylin´ska and Karwowska,
2014). For example, Koole and Coenen (2007) show that
action-oriented individuals (Kuhl, 1992) are good at spontaneous
regulation of negative affect (by reducing its intensity when it
is required). According to the authors emotion regulation is
a learned, habitual skill in action-oriented individuals, applied
with no conscious awareness of doing it. Another study, in
which action orientation was found to facilitate a decrease
of the influence of affect induced through subliminal priming
(Jostmann et al., 2005), supports the notion that the regulation
associated with the trait of action orientation may be automatic
(as action oriented participants were not aware they were
regulating their affect but still they were less influenced by it).
Such indirect evidence for the existence of automatic regulation
comes also from our research. In three experiments (Kobylin´ska,
2007), participants whose self-control standards were activated
before they performed affective priming task were less susceptible
to implicit affective stimuli (faces expressing disgust or joy
presented for 16ms) than participants from the control group.
Importantly, participants were not aware of the influence of the
manipulation of self-control standards on the subsequent task.
Other studies showed that effects of suboptimal priming was be
reduced by the activation of the reflective system of evaluation
(Jarymowicz and Kobyliñska, 2005; Karwowska and Kobylin´ska,
2014) or in people with certain personality characteristics, such as
a high level of cognitive self-distinctiveness, (Karwowska, 2007)
or a high level of using reappraisal habitually (Kobylin´ska and
Dyderska, 2009). We interpreted the findings using the concept
of automatic emotion regulation.
AUTOMATIC EMOTION
REGULATION—DIRECT EVIDENCE
The results of research described above are problematic to
be generalized, since automatic regulation of emotions was
not measured, but merely inferred. Soon, other researchers
started to more directly address the topic of automatic emotion
regulation, showing more evidence for its existence. Mauss
et al. (2006) conducted a study based on the assumption of a
relationship between the automatic goal of emotion regulation
and the implicit attitude toward regulation. They determined
the strength of the implicit positive attitude (applying a version
of Implicit Association Test), and measured the consequences
of anger induced through experimental manipulation. Both the
experience of anger and cardiovascular reaction were weaker
in individuals with a stronger implicit positive attitude toward
emotion regulation, which the researchers explained by the
mechanism of automatic regulation of emotions. In another
study (Mauss et al., 2007) the goals of either control or
expression of emotions were primed (participants were unaware
of the manipulation they were subjected to), using a scrambled
sentences task (procedure based on Bargh et al., 2001). In the
task participants have to form sentences out of given words. In
majority of the sentences words are associated with a concept that
is to be primed (in this case either emotion control or emotion
expression). The results showed that the automatic activation
of emotion control resulted in lower level of experienced anger
and weaker cardiovascular response than emotion expression
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priming, which we consider as a strong evidence for the
effectiveness of automatic emotion regulation.
As studies using priming in social psychology are discussed
more and more often and not all the researchers managed to
replicate, for example, the influence of priming on motivation
or behavior showed by Bargh (Yong, 2012; Rotteveel et al.,
2015), we decided to replicate the effect of primed emotion
control on experienced emotions (Kobylin´ska and Duszyñska,
2013). Based on the studies described above we predicted that
automatic activation of emotion control in a negative situation
would enable a reduction in negative emotions and an increase
in positive emotions. At the beginning of the experiment either
emotion control or emotion expression was primed (each in
a separate experimental group) by the scrambled sentences
procedure (based on Mauss et al., 2007). Participants were not
aware that the first part of the study was connected to a second
one. In the second part anger was induced by a frustrating task
in which achieving success was very difficult. Emotions were
measured by the Positive andNegative Affect Scale (Watson et al.,
1988) at the beginning and at the end of experiment. While
there were no significant differences in the level of experienced
negative emotions at the beginning of the study, it was found that
after the task aimed at inducing anger individuals from emotion
expression group declared a higher level of negative emotions
than did individuals from emotion control group. As for positive
emotions, there was no significant difference between the two
groups after the task. Nonetheless, in the emotion expression
group there was a reduction in the level of experienced positive
emotions after the task compared to the starting level. This effect
did not occur in the emotion control group. It is possible that
the lack of differences in positive emotions in emotion control
group indicates the effectiveness of the automatic activation of
control in preventing from the decrease in positive emotions.
Thus the results suggest that the activation of emotion control
allows for coping with the increase of negative emotions and with
the decrease of positive emotions in the negative situation, which
is in line with previous study byMauss et al. (2007) and proves the
existence and the effectiveness of automatic emotion regulation.
This conclusion still requires further research.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The research procedure applied in the study by Mauss and in
our study does not allow for the determination of which type
of emotion regulation (response-focused or antecedent focused)
or which emotion regulation strategy (e.g., reappraisal or
distraction) was activated by the priming task, and consequently,
which type of automatic regulation is effective (Sheppes and
Gross, 2012). Mauss et al. (2008) propose, for example,
introduction of automatic activation of emotion strategies from
different levels of the Gross’s model, e.g., reappraisal (from the
level of cognitive change), described as an adaptive strategy and
a method of effective emotion control, or suppression (from the
level of reaction modification), described as a rather maladaptive
strategy, related to some negative social, emotional, and cognitive
consequences (Williams et al., 2009). Recent research by Chrisou-
Champi et al. (2015) show that using reappraisal can be trained
and used later spontaneously, which suggests that this strategy
can become automatized. Experiments in which the specific
strategies of emotion regulation are automatically activated are
of our further interest and are being conducted in our lab.
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